We consider a canonical revenue maximization problem where customers arrive sequentially; each customer is interested in buying one product, and the customer purchases the product if her valuation for it exceeds the price set by the seller. The valuations of customers are not observed by the seller; however, the seller can leverage contextual information available to her in the form of noisy covariate vectors describing the customer's history and the product's type to set prices. The seller can learn the relationship between covariates and customer valuations by experimenting with prices and observing transaction outcomes.
Introduction
Online platforms today can often leverage detailed contextual information about participants when setting prices. For example, many e-commerce platforms are experimenting with approaches to personalize prices for customers, based on their prior search and purchase history (i.e. the customer's context) and/or the product's type. Personalization requires the platform to learn the optimal mapping from context to prices; in other words, optimal dynamic pricing is a particular form of contextual bandit problem for the platform. Our paper develops an approach to solving this problem motivated by practical considerations faced by online platforms.
In the formal model we consider, customers arrive sequentially in discrete time, and the platform must choose a price at which to offer an item for sale to this user. There are no capacity constraints, and the items are ex ante fixed; the only choice of the platform is the price. Each customer is characterized by a valuation (unobserved by the platform): her maximum willingness to pay for the item. The platform observes a feature vector, or covariate vector; this covariate captures both the customers context as well as the item's type. Once the platform chooses a price, the customer buys the item if and only if the price is lower than her valuation.
We emphasize three salient features of this model; taken together, these are the features that distinguish our work. First, feedback is only binary: either the customer buys the item, or she does not. In other words, the platform must learn from censored feedback. This type of binary feedback is a common feature of practical demand estimation problems, since typically exact observation of the valuation of a customer is not possible.
Second, the platform must learn the functional form of the relationship between the covariates and the expected valuation. In our work, we assume a parametric model for this relationship. In particular, we presume that the expected value of the logarithm of the valuation is linear in the covariates. Among other things, this formulation has the benefit that it ensures valuations are always nonnegative. Further, from a technical standpoint, we demonstrate that this formulation also admits efficient estimation of the parametric model.
Third, the platform must also learn the distribution of residual uncertainty that determines the actual valuation given the covariates; in other words, the distribution of the error between the expected logarithm of the valuation, and the actual logarithm of the valuation, given covariates. In our work we make minimal assumptions about the distribution of this residual uncertainty. Thus while the functional relationship between covariates and the expected logarithm of the valuation is parametric (i.e., linear), the distribution of the error is nonparametric; for this reason, we refer to our model as a semi-parametric dynamic pricing model.
Within this model, we consider algorithms that attain low regret against an appropriately defined oracle policy. In our case, we consider the following standard oracle: the policy that optimally chooses prices given the true coefficients in the parametric linear model, as well as the distribution of the error, but without knowledge of the exact valuation of each arriving customer. Within this framework we develop a policy with regret that scales asÕ( √ n) with respect to time horizon n. This matches the order in n of the lower bound obtained by [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003] for the special case of our model where all covariates are zero (i.e., the non-contextual case). Further, we also show that the regret of our policy scales polynomially in covariate dimension d and smoothness parameters κ 1 , κ 2 defined later.
Our policy treats the prices as arms in a multiarmed bandit. The challenge is to ensure that we can efficiently learn both the coefficients in the parametric model, as well as the distribution of the error, sufficiently quickly. We develop a simple pricing strategy which maintains a set of "active" prices at each time, where the set depends on the covariate vector of the current customer. The set of active prices is updated by eliminating prices for which there is enough evidence of sub-optimality, and thus the set shrinks over time as more evidence is gathered. From the set of active prices, a price is picked at random. As is the case in all models of contextual dynamic pricing, there are externalities in learning: each time a price is chosen for a customer with a given covariate vector, the outcome also informs the platform about the optimal price choice for customers with other covariate vectors. In our work we leverage this fact as follows: each randomly chosen price provides evidence regarding truthfulness of several candidate parameter values simultaneously, and thus we are able to show the active set shrinks quickly. This allows us to establish the regret bound above.
Related work
Non-contextual dynamic pricing. There is a significant literature on regret analysis of the dynamic pricing problem without covariates, where platforms experiment with prices to learn the demand function and optimize revenue; see [den Boer, 2015] for a detailed survey. For example, the works [Le Guen, 2008 , Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012 , den Boer and Zwart, 2013 , den Boer, 2014 , Keskin and Zeevi, 2014 ] consider a parametric model for the demand function where price experiments are used to learn the unknown parameters, whereas [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003 ] consider a non-parametric model for the unknown demand function where the price experiments are used to directly learn the optimal price. Our problem is different as we are interested in a dynamic pricing problem with covariates. Our model is semi-parametric, in that we use a parametric model for relationship between covariates and demand, but a nonparametric model for residual uncertainty in demand given covariates. Our methodology is more aligned to that of [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003] , in that we extend their techniques to incorporate side-information from the covariates.
Contextual dynamic pricing. Recently, the problem of dynamic pricing with high-dimensional covariates has garnered significant interest among researchers, e.g. see [Javanmard and Nazerzadeh, 2016 , Ban and Keskin, 2018 , Cohen et al., 2016 , Qiang and Bayati, 2016 , Nambiar et al., 2018 . In summary, in contrast to the prior works in dynamic pricing with covariates, ours is the first work to address a setting where the only feedback from each transaction is binary and the residual uncertainty given covariates is non-parametric. We believe that these features are relevant to several online platforms implementing dynamic pricing with high-dimensional covariates, and thus our work bridges a gap between the state of the art in literature and the practice. Below, we describe some of these prior works below.
1. [Javanmard and Nazerzadeh, 2016] consider a model where the expected valuation given covariates is a linear function of the covariates, and where the noise distribution is known. In other words, their model is fully parametric. Under certain conditions, they show that the expected regret is logarithmic in time horizon n. They also briefly consider a scenario where the noise distribution is unknown, but the expected regret they obtain there is linear in n.
2. [Ban and Keskin, 2018 ] consider a semi-parametric setting where the relationship between the expected demand, the covariates, and prices is parametric (in particular, generalized linear), and the residual noise is non-parametric; however, in their setting the true demand (analogous to the valuation in our model) is observed by the platform. Their model, as a special case, allows for binary feedback as well; however, in this special case the model is fully parametric. Under a sparsity assumption where only s out of d covariates impact the demand, they show that the optimal regret isÕ(s √ n log d).
3. [Qiang and Bayati, 2016] considers a model where the expected demand is a linear function of covariates and prices, and where the true demand is observed by the platform. Under certain conditions they show that a greedy iterative least squares policy is optimal and achieves O(log T ) regret.
4. [Nambiar et al., 2018] considers a setup where the model is misspecified; in particular, the expected demand is assumed to be a linear function of covariates and prices, but in reality the relationship of demand to covariates is nonlinear. Here again, the true demand at each time is observed by the platform. Due to misspecification, the noise term in the assumed model is correlated with the price. They develop an optimal policy where a random perturbation is added to a greedy choice of price, and use the perturbation as an instrument to obtain unbiased estimates.
5. [Cohen et al., 2016 ] consider a linear model for the valuation and covariate relationship and assume no noise, but the covariates are chosen adversarially. They develop an algorithm based on an ellipsoid method for solving a system of linear equations which has O(d 2 log(n/d)) regret.
Preliminaries
In this section we first describe our model and then our objective, which is to minimize regret relative to a natural oracle policy.
Model
At each time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have a new user arrival with covariate vector X t taking values in R d for d ≥ 1. Throughout the paper all vectors are encoded as column vectors. The platform observes X t upon the arrival of the user. The user's reservation value V t ∈ R is modeled as
where θ 0 ∈ R d is a fixed unknown parameter vector, and Z ′ t for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} captures the residual uncertainty in demand given covariates. The above formulation of V t ensures that V t > 0 for each t. Equivalently, we have
Contextual Non-parametric residuals Binary feedback [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003 where Z t = e Z ′ t . Thus, Z t > 0 for each t. The platform sets price (bid) p t , upon which the user buys (sells) the product
We assume that p t is σ (X 1 , . . . , X t−1 , Y 1 , . . . , Y t−1 , X t ) measurable, i.e., platform does not know the future. Without loss of generality, we will assume the setting where users buy the product. The revenue/reward
The goal of the platform is to design a pricing policy {p t } t∈{1,...,n} to maximize the total expected reward
In this paper we are interested in the performance characterization of optimal pricing policies as the time horizon n grows large.
We make the following assumption on statistics of X t and Z t .
A1. We assume that {X t } t and {Z t } t are i.i.d. and mutually independent. Their distributions are unknown to the platform. Their supports X and Z are compact and known. In particular, we assume that X ⊂ [0, 1] d and Z is an interval in [0, 1].
A1 can be significantly relaxed, as we discuss in the Conclusions section, both in terms of i.i.d. assumption and the compactness of supports.
A2. The unknown parameter vector θ 0 lies within a known, connected, compact
It follows from A1 and A2 that we can compute reals 0 < α 1 < α 2 such that for all (z, x, θ) ∈ Z × X × Θ we have
Thus, the valuation at each time is known to be in the set [α 1 , α 2 ], and in turn the platform may always choose price from this set. Note also that, since Z ⊂ [0, 1], for each (x, θ) ∈ X , we have that α 1 ≤ e θ ⊺ x ≤ α 2 .
The oracle and regret
It is common in multiarmed bandit problems to measure the performance of an algorithm against a benchmark, or Oracle, which may have more information than the platform, and for which the optimal policy is easier to characterize. Likewise, we measure the performance of our algorithm against the following Oracle.
Definition 1. The Oracle knows the true value of θ 0 and the distribution of Z t .
The following proposition is easy to show, so the proof is omitted.
Proposition 1. The following pricing policy is optimal for the Oracle: At each time t set price p t = z * e θ ⊺ 0 Xt where z * = arg sup z F (z).
Clearly, the total expected reward obtained by the Oracle with this policy, denoted as Γ * n , satisfies E[Γ * n ] = nz * E[e θ ⊺ 0 X1 ]. Our goal: Regret minimization. Given a feasible policy, define the expected regret against the Oracle as R n : R n = Γ * n − Γ n . Our goal in this paper is to design a pricing policy which minimizes E[R n ] asymptotically to leading order in n.
Smoothness Assumption
In addition to A1 and A2, we make a smoothness assumption described below.
Let
which can be thought of as the expected revenue of a single transaction when the platform sets price p = ze θ ⊺ x after observing a covariate X = x. We impose the following assumption on r(z, θ).
We assume that there exist κ 1 , κ 2 > 0 such that for each z ∈ Z and θ ∈ Θ we have
Recall that F (z) = zP(Z 1 ≥ z). It follows from A1 and conditioning on X 1 that
We will use this representation throughout our development.
Note that A3 subsumes the assumptions that z * is the unique maximizer of F (z) and that θ 0 is identifiable in the parameter space Θ. If A1 and A2 hold then A3 holds the uniqueness of the maximum of r(z, θ) at (z * , θ 0 ) and strictly local concavity at this point is sufficient for A3 to hold.
Optimal policy and regret
In this section, we first provide our policy, and then develop an upper bound on its regret.
Policy DEEP-C
We now describe our policy DEEP-C, i.e., Dynamic Experimentation and Elimination of Prices -with Covariates.
We partition the support of Z 1 into intervals of length n −1/4 . If the boundary sets are smaller, we enlarge the support slightly (by an amount less than n −1/4 ) so that each interval is of equal length, and equal to n −1/4 . Let the corresponding intervals be Z 1 , . . . , Z k , and their centroids be ζ 1 , . . . , ζ k where k is less than or equal to n 1/4 . Similarly, for l = 1, 2, . . . , d, we partition the projection of the support of the θ 0 into the l th dimension into k l intervals of equal length, with sets Θ
k l . Again, if the boundary sets are smaller, we enlarge the support so that each interval is of equal length, and equal to n −1/4 . Our algorithm keeps a set of active (z, θ) ⊂ Z × Θ and eliminates those for which we have sufficient evidence for being far from (z * , θ 0 ).
Our algorithm operates in rounds. We use τ to index the round. Each round lasts for one or more time steps. Let
represents the set of active (z, θ)'s.
During each time t in round τ we have a set of active prices, which depends on X t and A(τ ) × l B l (τ ). Let
During round τ , at each time t we pick a price p t from P (τ, t) uniformly at random. At time t, we say that cell
Each price selection checks one or more cells (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ). The round lasts until all active cells are checked.
Let t τ (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) be the first time in round τ when the cell (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) is checked. Recall that the reward generated ay time t is Y t p t . At the end of each round τ , for each active cell (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) we compute the empirical average of the rewards generated at the times t τ ′ (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) for τ ′ = 1, . . . , τ , i.e., we computeμ
Note that for each cell, in each round we only record reward at the first time the cell is checked and ignore rewards at the rest of the times in that round. We also compute confidence bounds forμ τ (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ), as follows. Let γ = max 10α 2 2 , 4 κ 2 2 log n , κ −2 1 log n . For each active (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ), let u τ (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) =μ τ (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) + γd log n τ , and l τ (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) =μ τ (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) − γd log n τ .
These represent the upper and lower confidence bounds, respectively.
Regret analysis
The main result of the paper is the following.
Theorem 1. Under A1, A2, and A3, the expected regret achieved by DEEP-C policy satisfies,
First, note that the above scaling is optimal w.r.t. n, as even for the case where X t = 0 w.p.1. it is known that achieving o( √ n) is not possible (see [Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003] ).
Second, we state our results with explicit dependence on various parameters discussed in our assumptions in order for the reader to track the ultimate dependence on the dimension d. Note that, as d scales, the supports Θ and X , and the distribution of X may change. In turn, the parameters α 1 , α 2 , κ 1 and κ 2 which are constants for a given d, may scale as d scales. These scalings need to be computed case by case as it depends on how one models the changes in Θ and X . Below we discuss briefly how these may scale in practice.
Recall that α 1 and α 2 are bounds on ze θ ⊺ x , namely, the user valuations. Thus, it is meaningful to postulate that α 1 and α 2 do not scale with covariate dimension, as the role of covariates is to aid prediction of user valuations and not to change them. For example, one may postulate that θ 0 is 'sparse', i.e., the number of non-zero coordinates of θ 0 is bounded from above by a known constant, in which case α 1 and α 2 do not scale with d. Dependence of κ 1 and κ 2 on d is more subtle as they may depend on the details of the modeling assumptions. For example, their scaling may depend on scaling of the difference between the largest and second largest values of r(z, θ). One of the beauties of Theorem 1 is that it succinctly characterizes the scaling of regret via a small set of parameters.
The rest of this section provides the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof follows from a few technical results that we state now. We provide the statements of these results and delegate their proofs to Section 3.4 to not interrupt the logical flow of the proof of the theorem. First, at the end of round τ , with high probability, the set of active arms corresponds to cells with guaranteed O log n τ expected regret. More precisely, recall the definitions of r(z, θ), ζ i , and θ (l)
We have the following result.
Lemma 1. For each round τ , let E 1 (τ ) be the event that the following holds:
and for each l
Then,
Second, not only are the corresponding active cells guaranteed to have small expected regret with high probability, but the size (Lebesgue measure) of the set of active prices is guaranteed to be small with high probability. The next result provides explicit bound on such size.
Lemma 2. For each τ , the event E 1 (τ ) implies that the following holds for each time t in round τ :
, where for each Borel set A, L(A) is its Lebesgue measure.
Third, after verifying that the remaining cells have a suitably controlled expected regret, and that the size of active arms (prices) is also controlled, we verify that at each time in the current round any given active cell is checked with substantially high probability.
Lemma 3. Fix round τ . Consider an active cell (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ). Then the probability that the cell (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) is checked at time t in round τ is at least α1n −1/4 L(P (τ,t)) .
Finally, using Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we are ready to piece together all of the elements (i.e., control on the performance of active arms, size of the remaining arms, and the speed at which arms are explored) to obtain the main result, as we do next.
Let E 2 (τ ) be the event that the round τ runs for at most 3d L(P (τ,t)) α1n −1/4 log n times. Since the number of cells is at most n d/4 , by Lemma 3 and union bound we obtain:
Also, recall event E 1 (τ ) from Lemma 1. By the law of total expectation, the expected regret incurred during round τ , i.e. the difference between expected reward earned by the oracle and the platform during round τ , denoted asR τ , satisfies the following:
Further, from (1) we have that P((E 2 (τ ) c ) ≤ n −2 , and from Lemma 1 we have that P((E 1 (τ ) c ) ≤ 4n −2 . Also, conditioned on events E 1 (τ ) and E 2 (τ ), we have the following:
(1) each round τ is of length at most 3d log n L(P (τ,t)) α1n −1/4 (form the definition of E 2 (τ )), and
(2) the regret incurred is at most 16κ 2 κ −1 1 γd log n τ (from the definition of E 1 (τ )),
Upon simplification, we obtain
2 γ 3/2 d 11/4 n 1/4 log 5/2 nτ −3/4 + 5α 2 n .
Thus, the total expected regret satisfies:
Hence, the theorem holds.
Appendix to the Proof of Theorem 1
We present the proofs of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 in order.
Proof of Lemma 1: For notational convenience and simplification of regret analysis, we pretend that the following happens at the end of a round: We simulate 'virtual times' during which we obtain virtual covariates and virtual prices so that we obtain a sample for each inactive set as well at round τ , and update u τ and l τ accordingly. These times do not count as real times, and since inactive sets do not take part in any decision making, the above procedure at virtual times incur no cost and have no bearing to the execution of the actual algorithm in practice. Throughout our development, we shall use that, as stated in A3,
and for each l,
Fix a cell (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) such that ∆(i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) > 16κ 2 κ −1 1 γd log n τ
. If no such cell exists, then there is is nothing to prove since in that case P(E 1 (τ )) = 1. We show that the probability of such a cell being eliminated is high. Let E ′ be the event that cell (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) has not been eliminated by the end of round τ . In addition, let E * m be the event that (i * , j * 1 , . . . , j * d ) is eliminated at round m, where (i * , j * 1 , . . . , j * d ) is the cell that contains (z * , θ 0 ). Using union bound, we can write
We have two claims, Claim 1: P(E * m ) ≤ 2 1 n 4d , and Claim 2: P (E ′ ∩ (∩ τ m=1 (E * m ) c )) ≤ 2 n 10d . It follows directly from Claims 1 and 2, since and τ ≤ n, that
Since total number of cells is at most n d/4 , we have that P((E 1 (τ )) c ) ≤ n d/4 4 n 3d ≤ 4 n 11d/4 ≤ 4 n 11/4 , and hence the lemma would follow. So, we just need to establish Claim 1 and Claim 2.
For Claim 1, note that
where the last inequality follows from the fact that l < u implies that for each c we have l < c or u ≥ c; we are choosing c = inf (z,θ)∈Z i * ×Θ j * 1 ×...×Θ j * d r(z, θ). Further, we have
Thus, using Hoeffding's inequality, we obtain
Fix (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ). From A3 and the fact that each cell is of size n −1/4 , we have r(z * , θ 0 ) − inf (z,θ)∈Z i * ×Θ j * 1 ×...×Θ j * d r(z, θ) ≤ κ 2 (n −1/4 ) 2 . Also, from the definition of γ we have that κ 2 ≤ γd log n 4 . Since τ ≤ n we get κ 2 (n −1/4 ) 2 ≤ γd log n 4τ
. Thus, we get that sup (z,θ)∈Zi×Θ
Thus,
Hence, the Claim 1 follows. We now show Claim 2. Note that
.
r(z, θ). Using the fact that for any u, l, c we have that u ≥ l implies u ≥ c or c ≥ l, and letting c = (r(z * , θ 0 ) − r(z ′ , θ ′ )) /2 we obtain
Now, by A3 and using the fact that γ ≥ κ −2 1 log n , we obtain that
Thus, |z * − ζ i | ≥ n −1/4 . Further, by construction of the partition, we have
Thus, we get ∆(i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) ≤ 4κ 2 κ −1 1 (r(z * , θ 0 ) − r(z ′ , θ ′ )). Consequently,
Again using Hoeffding's inequality, we get
. Thus, we have
Using Hoeffding's inequality yet again, we get P (l τ (i * , j * 1 , . . . , j * d ) ≤ r(z * , θ 0 ) − (r(z * , θ 0 ) − r((z ′ , θ ′ ))) /2) ≤ e − 2γd log n α 2 2 ≤ e −20d log n ≤ 1 n 20d . (7) Claim 2 thus follows from (5), (6) and (7). This completes proof of Lemma 1. We now proceed with the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Note that, by translation invariance, L(P (τ, t)) = L P (τ, t) − z * e θ ⊺ 0 xt . In addition, for any measurable set A, we always have the bound L(A) ≤ 2 a∈A |a|. Therefore, by definition of P (τ, t), we have
where Z A and Θ A be the set of active z and θ in round τ . Now, fix (z, θ) ∈ Z A × Θ a . Let z * − z = δ z and θ 0 − θ = δ θ . Then, at time t in round τ , we have
Recall that α 1 ≤ e θ ⊺ x ≤ α 2 for each x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ. Thus,
Thus, by triangle inequality, and noting that z * ≤ 1 as Z is a subset of the unit interval, we have
From Lemma 1, for each τ and each time t in round τ , with probability at least 1 − 4/n 2 the only active cells (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) are the ones such that
Also, for each θ,
we have e −δ ≤ sup(1, e −δ ⊺ θ xt ) ≤ α 2 /α 1 . Thus, by triangle inequality and noting that X and Θ are a subset of unit hypercube, we get
Thus, we get
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 3. Proof of Lemma 3: Since the price at time t is picked uniformly at random from P (τ, t), and since P i,j1,...,j d (τ, t) ⊂ P (τ, t), we have that the probability that the cell (i, j 1 , . . . , j d ) is checked at time t in round τ is equal to L(Pi,j 1 ,...,j d (τ,t)) L(P (τ,t))
. Thus, the result would follow if we show that L(P i,j1,...,j d (τ, t)) ≥ n −1/4 α 1 w.p. 1. We show that below. Fix θ from l Θ (l) j l . For each x ∈ X let P (x) p : ∃z ∈ Z i s.t. p = ze θ ⊺ x .
Since L(Z i ) = n −1/4 , for each x ∈ X we have L(P (x)) = n −1/4 e θ ⊺ x ≥ n −1/4 α 1 .
Thus, L(P (X t )) ≥ n −1/4 α 1 w.p. 1. But, by definition we have P (X t ) ⊂ P i,j1,...,j d (τ, t). Thus, L(P i,j1,...,j d (τ, t)) ≥ n −1/4 α 1 w.p. 1. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Conclusion and Extensions
In this paper we develop a pricing algorithm which leverages covariates and achieves optimal regret scaling in time horizon n. We characterize its scaling with respect to covariate dimension d via a small set of parameters which characterize compactness and smoothness of the underlying distributions. Further, some of our assumptions can be relaxed as we briefly describe below.
Relaxing compactness of support of covariates
The compactness assumption of X in A1 can be relaxed, as follows. Recall assumption A2. We say that a random variable W is σ-subgaussian if P(X > t) ≤ e −σ 2 t 2 . Consider the following assumption.
A4. {X t } t and {Z t } t are i.i.d. and mutually independent. Their distributions are unknown to the platform. The support of Z 1 , namely Z, is compact and known. Let W = sup z∈Z,θ∈Θ ze θ ⊺ X1 .
W is σ-subgaussian for a known σ > 0.
Under A2, and A3, and A4 we can obtain a result analogous to Theorem 1 as follows.
Recall that the policy DEEP-C requires knowledge of α 2 , which in this case may be infinity. However, the platform can compute α ′ 2 such that P (W > α ′ 2 ) ≤ 1/n 2 , and execute policy DEEP-C with α ′ 2 instead of α 2 . Thus, the probability of event {∃t ∈ {1, . . . , n}V t > α ′ 2 } is at most 1/n, and the overall impact of such an event on expected regret is O(1). Using the fact that, since Z and Θ are compact, there exists α ′ 1 > 0 (possibly unknown to the platform) such that P (W < α ′ 2 ) ≤ 1/n 2 , we can obtain a regret bound similar to Theorem 1.
Incorporating adversarial covariates
We believe that the i.i.d. assumption on covariates can also be significantly relaxed. As a prelude, consider the following modification to A1.
A5. We assume that {Z t } t are i.i.d. with compact support Z. We assume that the support of X t for each t is compact, namely X . Given the past, X t can be chosen adversarially from its support. More formally, we assume that X is σ(X 1 , . . . , X t−1 , Z 1 , . . . , Z t−1 , p 1 , . . . , p t−1 )-measurable.
Given Assumption A5, consider the following strengthening of Assumption A3. Recall that F (z) = zP(Z 1 > z). Let r(z, θ, x) = e θ ⊺ 0 x F e −(θ0−θ) ⊺ x z .
Given covariate x, r(z, θ, x) can be viewed as the expected revenue at (z, θ).
A6. We assume that there exist κ 1 , κ 2 > 0 such that for each z ∈ Z, θ ∈ Θ, and x ∈ X we have κ 1 (z * − z) 2 ≤ r(z * , θ 0 , x) − r(z, θ, x) ≤ κ 2 (z * − z) 2 , and for each 1 ≤ l ≤ d,
